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DUAL LOYALTY: THE JERUSALEM CASE

by Alfred M. Lilienthal

The second half of the Twentieth Century has dawned on a troubled world. Amidst the tumult of conflicting ideologies, adherents of an ancient creed find themselves still perplexed by a 2500 year old problem. Since the fall of the kingdom of Judah in 586 B.C., the Jew has been seeking a solution of his dilemma: race or faith; chosen people or universality; nationality or religion.

Events since the birth of Israel indicate that American Jews no longer can exist as half a people, half a religion. Continued reference by press and radio to the "Jewish" flag, the "Jewish" State and the "Jewish" Premier, together with organized Jewry's constant self-identification with Israel, has caused confusion in the public mind. Anti-Semitism, nurtured on the old libel that the Jews are necessarily a distinct and foreign group within the body politic, has grown.

The present controversy over the control of the Holy City strengthens the feeling that "these are strangers in our midst". In support of the Israeli position, American Jews were called upon to take a High Holiday Oath "not to forsake thee, Jerusalem". Foreign Minister Sheratt, on his arrival in the United States from Tel Aviv for the U.N. session, called for the support of "World Jewry behind Israel's claim for Jerusalem". An organized campaign was directed at Congress, the State Department and the President in favor of the Israeli viewpoint.

If May 14, 1948, which brought forth the sovereign State of Israel, was D-Day for Israeli Jews, history may record December 13, 1949, as D-Day for the five million Jews of the United States. On that day, in direct defiance of the resolution of the United Nations Assembly to internationalize the City of Jerusalem, Israeli Premier Ben Gurion announced in Tel Aviv that his government offices were being transferred to the Holy City. During the U.N. debate and ensuing vote the United States sided with Israel. Outvoted in the General Assembly, the United States warned Israel against any rash moves.

Jews and Christians alike can deeply sympathize with the view that there can be no Israel without Jerusalem. The Israeli emotional outburst in the face of the United Nations mandate (essentially only a reiteration of the 1947 partition recommendation, to which Israel owes

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its very existence) is wholly understandable. The same cannot be said for the stand of American Jewry, which cannot afford to let emotionalism decide its position on this or other problems involving Israel.

II

In the first clear test where a choice had to be made, organized Jewry in the United States is backing the government of Israel as against their own government's clear duty towards its U.N. obligations. Organized Jewry, as one voice, has spoken out on the side of a foreign government. Not even a whisper was heard to dispute the public statement: "The Jews fully support the Jews of Israel in whatever steps they may take to defend the integrity and centrality of Jerusalem as their National Capital."

This sheds significant light on a question unresolved since the partition of Palestine: Would Jewish nationalists be satisfied with the creation of a sovereign Israel and permit Jews outside to go their own way? Or, would they, in line with the political philosophy of the Zionist movement, as laid down by Theodore Herzl in 1896, insist that there had been created a "collective Jewish Nation with its center in Israel".

Article 3 of the draft Constitution of Israel, which now, a year after its promulgation, is to be made permanent, says: "The State of Israel is designed to be the National Home of the Jewish People." The Jerusalem issue illustrates why this article does not limit the State of Israel to being the national home of its people and its people only, of whatever former national derivations. The "Jewish People" concept can be used to associate nationally with the State of Israel millions of individuals, citizens of nations other than Israel, and to give them dual loyalties.

There have been other serious attempts to impute nationhood to Jews everywhere. At a farewell party for delegates of an American Zionist organization, Premier Ben Gurion said, according to a dispatch carried by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency on August 31, 1949:

"Although we realized our dream of establishing a Jewish State, we are still at the beginning. Today there are only 900,000 Jews in Israel, while the greater part of the Jewish people [emphasis supplied] is still abroad. Our next task will not be easier than the creation of the Jewish State. It consists of bringing all Jews to Israel. . . . We appeal chiefly to the youth of the United States and in other countries to help us achieve this big mission. We appeal to the parents to help us to bring their children here. Even if they decline to help, we will bring the youth to Israel, but I hope this will not be necessary."

Eliahu Dobkin, Immigration Chief of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, has published a detailed plan which would convert Zionist youth movements throughout the world into "pioneer" recruiting centers for Israel. On the sidewalks of New York, in the theatrical district Christmas Eve, young lads paraded the Israeli flag and collected money "to send pioneers to Israel". This movement has for its goal, to use Dobkin's words, "the restoration of the Jewish people to Israel".

III

In October, Israeli Ambassador Elath in Washington protested to our State Department an alleged mass persecution of Jews in Iraq. This was denied by the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. After investigations by the U.S. Ambassador in that country it was announced that the charge that 2,000 Jews had been imprisoned could not be substantiated. True, there had been some Jewish arrests on the charge of Communist or Zionist activity, both movements having been outlawed in Iraq. It was also true that the Chief Rabbi of Iraq had been beaten up, but by Zionists, when he maintained that they were Iraqi first and Jews second.

Regardless of the merits of the conflicting claims, it is curious that this protest was initially lodged in Washington and not at Lake Success. If Israel could find justification for its intervention in behalf of Iraqi citizens in the existence of a world-wide Jewish nationality, it could follow logically that we may see Israel formally protesting any mistreatment of Jews in Nevada or any other state or nation.

Portents of this character have not gone unnoticed. For the first time the American scene is reverberating with significant warnings. In the epilogue of Arthur Koestler's new book, Promise and Fulfillment, this self-described "supporter of the Zionist movement for a quarter of a century" discusses the possible repercussions of Israel on the future of world Jewry. And Koestler concludes:

"Now that the State of Israel is firmly established the Jews are at last free to do what they could not do before: to wish it good luck and go their own way with an occasional friendly glance back and a helpful gesture, but nevertheless to go their own way, with the nation whose life and culture they share, without reservations, or split loyalties."

IV

Such outstanding liberals as Arthur Garfield Hays and Dorothy Thompson have been brave enough to speak out. In a Philadelphia speech, Miss Thompson has branded the Zionist doctrine of the Jewish nation as an anti-Semitic idea. The Reader's Digest and Harper's Magazine have carried full length articles on the question of divided loyalties.

Organized Jewry has struck back, vilifying those who criticize, and has even proposed establishment of controls over all Jewish organizations to curb new sources of censure. So it appears that infringement of the fundamental American doctrine of free speech is part of the issue.

A once hypothetical question has now become a serious reality. The future of Jerusalem may well be settled by a compromise agreement between Hashemite Jordan and Israel, acceded to out of necessity by the United Nations. But the problem of dual loyalties will raise itself again and again, because of the unconsidered emotional acts of those who maintain the mistaken idea that religious loyalty to Judaism, the faith, demands a political loyalty to Israel, the nation.

The undiluted Americanism of the overwhelming majority of American Jews is beyond question. They know that here is the one land in which Jews have always enjoyed equal rights under the law. Their only fault lies in unwittingly playing fellow traveller to a small minority whose usurpation of their voice they condone by silence. Apparently, this apathetic majority does not yet realize the extent to which the accepted fiction of Jewish unity involves them personally in actions which give root to anti-Semitism, and make them suspect of dual loyalty.

They do not yet discern that this country cannot afford to be tolerant toward any persons who would break it up into component national groups, seeking either the advancement of the country of their origin or of the country that contains the seat of their religious inspiration.

The call now is for courageous leadership from the pulpit, the press and in the home. Jews must point out the vast difference between voluntary philanthropy toward co-religionists and the pressuring of Jews as Jews to speak as a unified national bloc in behalf of a foreign government. Christians must cease whispering intolerant lies, defaming the many for the faults of the few. Let guilty individuals be denounced openly and the innocent accepted without trace of discrimination as friends, neighbors and co-citizens of this, their country.

Such leadership could keep Judaism straight on the course of its historic mission. All religions alike seek to achieve, but have yet to accomplish, the brotherhood of man and the attainment of peace.

Alfred Lilienthal is a Washington attorney, writer and lecturer on international subjects, formerly with the Department of State.

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By Frank C. Hanighen

January 18, 1950

FORMOSAN DEBATE: The fight over Formosa went into a new round on January 17 in the Senate. Last week left the Republicans a bit groggy. They had leaned heavily on the argument that Formosa was vital to our defense system, and the pipelines from the Pentagon had been pumping overtime to the GOP, to support this claim. But, when it was decided to call the defense chiefs to the Hill, it was realized that they could not be trusted to tell the whole truth. With the example of Admiral Denfeld before them, what general or admiral would care to risk his career? Accordingly, this week a new GOP tack appeared.

This time, the Republican Senators took their stand on legality. "We have no right to occupy a country because it is strategic", said Senator Millikin, "we have the formal duty of taking care of conquered territory until proper disposition is made in a treaty." Senator Ferguson concurred, "The trusteeship of Chiang in Formosa is the same as MacArthur's trusteeship in Japan." Senator Taft later expanded the line in a released statement, "The status of Formosa should certainly be kept free for determination until the peace treaty has been written with Japan"; he said that, if given self-determination, the Formosans would vote for independence.

Meanwhile, the GOP minority was tamping down the soil on the interred bipartisan policy. The Democratic leaders had earlier on the 17th held a party caucus to rally support for the Administration stand; and they got it, unanimously. This added fuel to Republican attacks on bipartisanship. Senator Jenner said the China debacle proved the bipartisan policy to be a "gigantic hoax". Senator Vandenberg, the father of that policy, remained silent. And there were reports that hereafter Senator Taft, foe of the policy, would direct GOP foreign policy in the Senate. Senator Ferguson renewed his arguments that the Democratic Administration was pursuing a pro-Communist policy in the Far East; and claimed that this Administration line was based on a secret report sent by Henry Wallace in 1944 to President Roosevelt. Later, Wallace confirmed that he had filed such a report and complained that the State Department did not include a copy in that document of "famous reticencies", the White Paper. Wallace in this 1944 report said that the Communists would be better friends of the U.S. than the China Nationalists. (Incidentally, we have just consulted the huge tome of the White Paper and find that, on page 553, first paragraph, Wallace remarked on the "patriotic attitude" of the Communists in the United States, during the war; and said he could not understand why Chiang Kai-shek mistrusted the Communists in China.) Ferguson is said to believe that this same pro-Communist policy is the real controlling policy which Acheson intends to pursue in respect to Southern Asia from now on.

Today, it is beginning to dawn on some Senators that, if Formosa falls into Communist hands, the American taxpayer will face increased burdens. Economists now produce figures to show that Formosa and Hainan provide vital materials for the enfeebled Japanese economy, to support which our occupation regime spends huge sums. Formosa sends Japan salt, sugar, alcohol and many other commodities; Hainan supplies large quantities of iron ore. Formosan exports to Japan in the first six months of 1949 amounted to approximately \$780 million; and each month of last year showed a sharp increase over the month before. The fact is that Formosa before the war was closely integrated with Japan's home economy. If Formosa fell to the Reds, the bill for occupation support would rise sharply.

DOMESTIC POLITICS: The real impetus behind the new, much-publicized development in the House Rules Committee seems to be House Members' desire to shorten the session so that they will have more time for re-election in their constituencies. The Rules Committee last week moved to change procedure so that it could more easily bottle up controversial legislation. Since this proposed change would presumably obstruct Fair Deal legislation, the President has urged defeat of the Committee's move.

The Communist press in this country has been building up a big campaign against wire-tapping and -- observers believe -- this will culminate in a conference on "civil rights" or some other form of ballyhoo. The Americans for Democratic Action group, as it has on other issues, shows some signs of following suit, but quite independently of the Communists. The campaign is directed at curtailment of the power of J. Edgar Hoover, who has shown by a series of statements in the past week that he will fight to retain freedom to wire-tap, for security purposes. Wire-tapping has been very detrimental to the Communist Party and very useful to the FBI in watching the Communists.

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FOREIGN NOTES: While bets favor the Labor Party in the coming British general election, Tories take hope from a study by Prof. R. B. McCallum of Oxford. During the 1945 election, McCallum predicted a sweeping Labor victory. Now he contends that a shift of only about 6 per cent by the voters would defeat the Government. By-elections in the last two years, he says, indicate that there was a swing of from 6 to 7 per cent, to the Right, in these contests.

Renewal of formal diplomatic relations between the West German Republic and Western Powers is expected to take place within the next few months. At present, the British and American government representatives are arguing about the form of legal procedure involved. But the principal of relations has been accepted and it remains only to work out the details. Whether exchange of consuls will precede exchange of ambassadors is one of the questions not yet resolved.

While Britain has announced her decision to recognize the Chinese Communist Government, diplomats have not yet been exchanged and an agreement on details has not been reached. It is reported that British emissaries are kept cooling their heels in Peiping, while the Communists show no haste in the matter.

It is believed in some circles that the "Acheson Line" -- that is, American backing for the governments involved -- will be as follows: Philippines, Indonesia, Malaya and India. It is therefore inferred that not only Formosa, but Korea, French Indo-China, Siam and Burma will be "thrown to the dogs". In this connection, it is noted that Siamese gold, on deposit in Tokyo, has just been flown to the U.S.

The question of full recognition of Spain by the United States remains somewhat obscure, but it is believed by many that it has been decided affirmatively in principle by Mr. Acheson. There is a story that details of the matter are under some controversy between White House and State Department. There is also a rumor that Mr. Acheson for some time has been annoyed by knowledge that big international utility interests played an important role in preventing renewal of full relations last spring. (See Not Merely Gossip for August 24, 1949.)

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CONNECTICUT POLITICS: The success of Taft in Ohio and the debate over the Formosan affair have given stimulus to the GOP body politic and raised its hopes. But it would be imprudent for Republicans to assume that real strength had returned to the Party; there is only one Taft, and the Formosan affair, valuable as it is for the purpose of undermining bipartisanship, can backfire or fizzle out. A picture of

Republican politics in one state, Connecticut, illustrates how defensive is GOP strategy. Talk in Republican circles in Connecticut is that Mrs. Claire Luce will not run for Senatorship, but that her husband, Mr. Henry Luce, the publisher, may do so. In this case, the wife is much more valuable to the Party than the husband.

How the GOP plans to handle the problem of Senatorial candidates -- for there will be two Senatorial races this year -- shows the weakness of the GOP. The two Democratic candidates will be incumbents McMahon and Benton. McMahon is infinitely the stronger of the two. Republican strategists believe that McMahon is probably unbeatable, Benton beatable. Therefore, they contemplate running the stronger of their candidates against Benton, the weaker against McMahon. There is much support for the idea that former Congressman Talbot of Litchfield County would be the most successful vote-getter; and not many hopes are placed on Mr. Henry Luce's attraction at the polls. Therefore, Talbot may run against Benton and Luce against McMahon. Thus, the GOP would feel reasonably certain of sending one Senator to Washington. Additionally, the boys in the clubhouses, worried over lack of money, see an advantage in having Luce run, for he would finance his own campaign. All this may be the best strategy but it hardly inspires overconfidence nor indicates that a great surge of GOP sentiment is on the way in the Nutmeg State. And Connecticut is not unique in this respect.

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BRITAIN: It is no wonder that Labor is the favorite in the betting on the coming British general election. The fuse of the time-bomb of devaluation takes some time to burn and so far unemployment figures show little change and prices have not risen very much. Low, the cartoonist, satirized an optimistic utterance of the Chancellor of Exchequer, by drawing a little girl being measured for her height; her shoes with very high heels represented Marshall Plan Aid. But the average British voter does not examine the dull figures which show that Britain is earning fewer dollars now than before devaluation. Nor does that voter read the New York Times, whose editorial on January 15 summed up the situation: "Britain, by resort to the drastic course of devaluation, has induced a gold transfusion, which gives it a certain amount of time in which to work out its basic exchange problem; and that is all. Its real problem is reflected in the £279 million deficit in the United Kingdom's trade with the dollar countries and the overall deficit of the sterling area of £400 million. No rise in Britain's gold reserve [reported last week] that is readily conceivable can guarantee her continued solvency so long as this fundamental disequilibrium in her trade is permitted to continue."

Nor would the British worker be in a position to note an even more illuminating index of his country's plight. Today, you can buy pounds in New York for \$2.40, whereas the official rate is \$2.80. The decline from the new official rate, as a matter of fact, commenced right after devaluation -- this column in the issue of November 2, 1949, on the morrow of devaluation, reported that the pound could be purchased in New York for \$2.68. Today's unofficial rate of \$2.40 shows that capital is seeping out of Britain. A monetary expert writes us his comments on the situation: "Amid signs that the Western European currencies are becoming more stable, with fewer discounts available in the black market, the British pound remains a conspicuous exception. Although the pound was radically devalued by 30% per cent last September, it is now freely traded in other European countries at 17 to 20 per cent discount from the new official rate; basic reason is distrust of the present anti-capitalistic government. Even if the official rate were lowered, the pound could not be freed under the present government, for otherwise wealthy or moderately well-to-do Englishmen would have transferred their liquid capital from that regulation-ridden land, in a flood. As long as the pound is not freed, there is no way of avoiding an active black market with rates below the official level, no matter where that level might be fixed.

Book Events


The Idea of Progress: A Collection of Readings, selected by Frederick J. Teggert; revised by George H. Hildebrand. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press. \$6.00. Reviewed by J. M. Lalley.

This book appears to have been conceived as a sort of supplement to the famous study by Professor Burry, published under the same title. As originally compiled by Professor Teggert more than 20 years ago it consisted of relevant excerpts from the writers to whom Burry had credited the development of the doctrine that the general direction of historical change is toward a steady improvement in the conditions of human life. As enlarged by Professor Hildebrand, however, the anthology now includes writings illustrative of older theories of historical evolution.

These have been classified as the degenerative, the cyclical and the providential. The degenerative theory is, of course, almost directly opposite to the notion of progress. Instead of a movement toward infinite improvement, history is interpreted as a progressive decline from some primordial perfection. Thus Hesiod tells of a time when evil and strife and sorrow were unknown upon earth, and how this golden age was succeeded by the ages of silver and of bronze and of iron, each more woeful than the last, and its inhabitants morally and physically inferior to those who preceded them. A similar concept is implicit in the story of the expulsion from Paradise, as related in the first chapters of Genesis. The cyclical theory, elaborated by Plato and Aristotle, and revived in our own time under new forms by Spengler and Toynbee, is that successive civilizations evince similar patterns of growth, maturity and decay. Under the influence of this theory ancient political philosophy concerned itself with the problem of whether the process of change can be arrested when social institutions have reached the fullness of their development. The providential theory is that which perceives history as a divinely ordered series of events leading to the fulfillment of revelation.

The great exponent of the providential theory is St. Augustine. His synthesis encompasses the whole of history and the whole of human life into a single unique episode with a known origin and a known end, which is the redemption and salvation of the righteous. This concept dominated the thought of the Middle Ages almost as completely as the notion of progress dominated the Nineteenth Century; but the earlier theories were revived with the Renaissance. The exaggerated veneration of antiquity contained an implicit acknowledgment of degeneration; at the same time the authority of ancient writers restored the cyclical theory, which found new expositors in Machiavelli and Vico. It remained, however, for Descartes to provide an intellectual climate suitable to the development and domination of the novel idea of progress. Cartesian philosophy by affirming the supremacy of reason undermined the authority of both antiquity and revelation; by asserting the invariability of natural processes it contradicted the possibility of divine intervention in earthly affairs. Yet the doctrine of progress was not fully formulated until the Eighteenth Century in the famous essay of the Marquis de Condorcet. But this roseate vision of an accelerating march of mankind to ever greater happiness was soon shattered by the violences of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars; so that when the picture of progress was reassembled by Saint-Simon and Comte the focus was no longer upon human happiness so much as upon scientific achievement.

It now seems unlikely that the idea of progress in any form can survive the experiences of the Twentieth Century or the influence of the new philosophies, such as Freudianism. The anti-rational temper of the age is all against it; and even if this were not so, its chief intellectual prop has now been removed by the mathematicians and the physicists.



By Bertrand de Jouvenel

PARIS -- January, 1950

THANKS TO TITO: The British have recognized Mao Tse-tung as the rightful government of China. When Mao celebrated the New Year with Stalin they were aware of this impending move. They must have dedicated a kind thought to Tito. For they owe him this great diplomatic victory. His unpunished secession has encouraged Western policy makers to put their hopes in further secessions: Mao is to be another Tito.

Seceding Communist tyrants are to be offered, according to an already established pattern, British advice, British trade agreements, American money and machines, American protection; ultimately they are to be provided with arms and drawn into a wide scheme of collective security, including national Communist with democratic societies.

From the angle of Realpolitik the test of this grand strategy is its success. The bigger the battalions the better the chances. Let us however be clear that we are thereby rejecting moral standards in international affairs, and that the American sword is henceforth to be drawn equally in defense of tyranny and of liberty.

It can be forcibly argued that alliances are a matter of expediency, ruled by the necessity of containing dangerously expanding powers. Did not Liberal England uphold in the Nineteenth Century the rotten Ottoman despotism? And is it not true that Europe paid dearly for the reversal of this policy? This line may be taken, but it is then a palpable inconsistency to exclude from our alliance such non-Communist States, the internal regime of which does not meet with our approval.

If History can provide many arguments in favor of the Realpolitik outlook, the student of our own times must stress the monstrous danger of this line in our democratic societies. It is very much to the credit of the people that the forces of public opinion cannot be marshalled without an appeal to the moral sense. If our cause is the Right one, it is not easy to explain that some of our allies are just as bad as our opponents. Nor do some intellectuals make it any easier by their curious propensity to sugar-coat with moralism the bitter pill of expediency.

It has taken the West all of five years to emerge from the moral befuddlement attendant upon the Russian alliance. Of course the condemnation of Germans for crimes against humanity was marred by the presence among the judges of those responsible for many Katyns. Of course the penance done by Germany for its aggressive imperialism fails to drive home its lesson while Germany's original accomplice wallows in its conquests. In September, 1939, Leon Blum branded Stalin as responsible for the war: "Had he signed with England and France, war would have been impossible or highly improbable, his signing with Germany made it almost inevitable." (Le Populaire, September 21, 1939.)

We have lived through years of scandalous would-be moralism, deferentially consulting mass murderers on the right wording of a Charter of the Rights of Man. It was a stifling atmosphere, a nightmare of values. We are at long last emerging from it. Is it to be plunged again into confusion?

Let us beware. We have in the West a mass of morally spineless intellectuals whose impotent desire for boldness, discipline and strength turns to a female craving for Communist company. The present explosion of moral disapproval against Stalinism has frightened them away from the Moscow shrine: they are offered an unhopd-for alternative: they can do their pilgrimage to Belgrade. Who will blame them for praising on their return the institutions of a valued ally? There are not a few signs that Tito may prove the Trojan Horse in the Western camp.

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EUROPEAN NIHILISM: We want Tito and other such to help us defend Western Europe which we do not feel strong enough to defend by ourselves. In the same manner the declining Roman Empire called upon Barbarian allies. They caused the corruption, breaking apart and downfall of Rome: so will it be with us. For the lack of strength which makes them desirable associates also makes their influence irresistible. It is a lack of moral strength. There never was in Europe a more numerous population than there is today to withstand the assault of Asia. Nor was the Roman Empire lacking in numbers or equipment: on the eve of its collapse it stood incomparably superior in quantities of men and arms to what Rome was when she ranged the known world under her laws. But one thing had departed: virtue.

Europe is internally eaten away by doubt, distrust and cynicism. It is perhaps the tragedy of our age that Socialism -- practically, reliance on others -- is offered as a cure for a feeling of insecurity which could only be cured by a restoration of self-reliance. Nor are great physical assets a condition of such self-reliance. Men are not cowards: they have the courage of their convictions; it is the convictions that they need. Nihilism is Europe's malady.

It is not fear of the Cossacks which reduces Europe to a helpless jelly. It is doubt of the justice of our cause, a vague feeling that the Communists may have Right and History on their side. Perhaps after all their system is the fulfillment of democracy -- and here the follies of Western war propaganda come to roost -- and is not their creed the tail-end of our prevailing beliefs?

We can be thankful for the crazy Valhalla lyricism which made the Nazi creed unpalatable and ridiculous to the West. The Soviets on the contrary speak the language of utilitarian technocracy which is the common language of the West. In my country the youth who was tempted by Nazism was usually a romanticist. In direct contrast it is striking to see juveniles simultaneously buying a magazine about engineering and a pamphlet about Russia. Minds cluttered with factual knowledge avidly absorb the dreary tale of figures uttered by the Moscow radio.

Taught by their masters to doubt all beliefs and by too many surrounding examples to deride them, their gods are machines and the "building of Socialism" is to them as entrancing as a gigantic game of Meccano. Stalin is to them a more tangible Einstein, who has also written out the laws of the world on his blackboard.

The watcher who sees them merrily putting in their little rivet is apt to be moved by their boyish enthusiasm. We must be prepared to have again and again the sort of thing American correspondents in China have been giving us: that the Communists entered Shanghai in admirable order and seemed animated by excellent feelings. Whoever thinks that great things, even bad, can be achieved without an appeal to virtue and the play of virtues, knows little of man. All the dangerous seductions of our age have owed their effectiveness to the virtues they enrolled.

So there can be no antipathy in the heart of the watcher who in a small village, in a suburb, sees a youth enthusiastically enrolling his good will in the Communist cause. He tries to argue this recruit away: and finds no effective weapon in the armory of his Nineteenth Century ideas. Shall he speak of progress, of evolution, of enlightenment? This is it! answers the youth: Society moves forward, rejects the last of superstitions, the new man emerges: the rebuilder of the world. Yes, but freedom of thought? Why, would you not, the youth retorts, move to the foot of the class those who do not give the right answer in the right figures? But must you crush human beings? Why not, if it is to benefit a greater number?

The watcher moves on, troubled in his Nineteenth Century mind. He has no answers. The Nineteenth Century biological outlook provides no justification for the absolute value of the individual life. Nineteenth Century relativism in regard to truth must logically emerge into a pragmatism which admits that deviationist be-

liefs are bad because they are deviations and enervate the collective effort. Thus the Nineteenth Century utilitarian must give up. But as he moves on he sees the priest moving in to the Communist lair. The priest indeed is the only one who in fact tackles the venture. His is the only non-Communist voice which makes itself heard in Communist circles; a situation which is not without its dangers for religion itself which some non-believers would use as a social weapon. But the very existence of this situation testifies to the inherent weakness of current humanism, incapable of making an effective appeal to the people in its own name.

The weakness of Europe lies in the absence of convictions, and consequent lack of power to convince, of its great mass of intellectuals.

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RETURN TO WAGE BARGAINING IN FRANCE: The most important event in France this month is the new regime for wages. Up to now, wages were fixed by the government. Though the Ministry of Labor has been continuously in Socialist (after Communist) hands, the system has resulted in an exceptionally low level of wages. And it is perhaps worth pointing the lesson.

The great idea of the unions was that rulings should apply to all wages. The wage rate of a distinct occupation was to rule for the whole industry throughout the country, with narrow rebates in the areas where cost of living was lowest (away from centers). This brought about a relative increase of wages in the more provincial areas and in the smaller businesses. But, on the other hand, as the wage rate was fixed throughout the industry, the firms best able to pay higher wages were precluded from doing so, with a distinct loss of wages to their employees and a failure of such businesses to attract the best personnel.

From time to time the increase in the cost of living caused demands for wage raises and these caused major political crises, the Communist-dominated CGT usually making the pace and the rival, much weaker unions apt to rather overbid than underbid in a frenzy to win membership away from the CGT. Such general increases, which were, on occasions, of as much as 25 per cent, of course failed to durably improve the position of the workers, for business passed them on to the consumer. There was a curious inability on the part of trade-unionists to understand that costs were not increased to the individual firm in proportion to its own employment of labor, but at least in proportion to the share of wages in production as a whole. Nor did trade-unionists understand that the consequent rise in the price-level, equivalent to the fall in the worth of the franc, obliged firms to increase amortizations and reserves, so that the final mark-up took back from the worker as consumer almost all of his gain.

The two lessons the unions should have learned from this long experiment, which has left industrial workers with lower real wage rates than they have known in a generation, are that the fixing of a wage throughout the industry lessens the total takings of that industry's employees, and that the raising of all wages at once, in a state of full employment, while most spectacular is also of least effect. Yet in the new era of collective bargaining which now opens, national wage rates and simultaneous boosts constitute their grand strategy. It is to be granted that this method is the more impressive and flatters the workers with the delusion that the unions are doing a great thing.

It is to be hoped that the individual employers will take the initiative of granting such raises as they may. But the French employers are all too apt to congratulate themselves on their good manners if they do not pay as much as they might, for the neighbor may not or will not. Just as they regard it as good manners not to undercut a competitor. The solidarity of employers and the solidarity of sellers, sealed in the corporative organization of war time, is stultifying the free economy.

The competitive spirit is regarded as boorish aggressivity. The formal return to competition must in this psychological climate fail to bear its fruits. And if it does not bear its fruits it must be short-lived.

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LESSONS FROM THE FIRST WORLD PEACE: Western Europe has moved back to political and economic institutions which we are wont to regard as normal, and therefore self-preserving. The problem seemed to be the move back, and as we regard such institutions as conditions of equilibrium we think their very existence assures their endurance. Before we abandon ourselves to such optimism we might do well to ponder what happened after the first World Peace.

Our forgetful contemporaries are apt to regard the ruin of liberal political and economic institutions as the brutal work of Hitler. But this is an historical error. These had fallen all over the place before Hitler had even become Chancellor of the Reich. The Big Three of 1919 had reconstructed Europe on the lines which even now seem to us representative of our ideas. They had swept away, as Benès said, the remains of absolute monarchies and of privileged classes and had drawn frontiers to fit the nationalities, had built or favored internal institutions to reflect the will of the people, had provided for peaceful settlement of international disputes, had set up an international machinery for social progress and to protect the rights of Labor, they had advocated and prepared a return to freedom of commercial exchange. We would, indeed, regard ourselves as happy had we moved as far as the Three and their immediate successors. Yet all this tumbled down bit by bit with extreme rapidity.

Had it not tumbled down of itself, Hitler would have been impossible. I would not say for certain but he was in point of time something like number seven on the list of European post-war dictators. His over-running Europe was not the cause but the disastrous result of a collapse of Liberal Europe. This should be borne in mind and a careful study of this collapse might be of service to the present reconstructors of Europe. There are visible portents in many Continental countries that the present institutions flower only in the artificial climate of American help. Let us remember that we had the sort of Germany we held desirable for just as long as dollars flowed into it. The comparison may be more apt than we would wish it.

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PRECARIOUSNESS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: In none of the main countries of Continental Europe can I find any reliable sign that the political institutions are solidly backed by the nation, as they are, say, in England. There is a clear tendency for parliamentary democracy to function in a void of public opinion; in France, the artifice of proportional representation, so fatal to the Weimar Republic, has severed any personal link between the representative and the electorate. The latter is out of touch with its agents in Parliament and their tussles are regarded with growing indifference. The press which must sell itself to its readers gives less and less place to political problems which are always treated from the picturesque angle: and it is to be seen in any public means of conveyance that newspaper readers skip the political news. The visible tendency of the citizen is not to back a party or movement standing for any special line but to stand aside and judge the workings of the political institutions as a whole, with increasing distrust. In this atmosphere of distrust it is almost impossible for a government to get enough public support to overcome an organized sectional interest, and this causes governments to in fact strike a series of compromises with all active interests. The result is somewhat short of a Republic where citizens are to be vividly conscious of the public interest and active in its favor. It is to be feared that the present institutions will prove unequal to any great strain, such as that resulting from the necessity of doing without Marshall Aid. Europe in short is quite conspicuously doing well. But its equilibrium is very far from stable.

1710 RHODE ISLAND AVENUE, N. W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C.